The Relist Watch column examines cert petitions that the Supreme Court docket has “relisted” for its upcoming convention. A brief clarification of relists is offered here.
This Friday’s convention marks the Supreme Court docket’s final actual likelihood to grant petitions in time for argument on the courtroom’s April sitting – the final sitting of this time period. The courtroom already has an unprecedented 91 relisted circumstances in competition for these slots. This week it added 17 extra relisted circumstances elevating 10 distinct authorized points. Grants might come as quickly as Friday.
Three of those cases increase acquainted Second Modification challenges to the felon-in-possession statute – there are actually dozens of such relists which have been pending for weeks. We gained’t deal with these additional. In one other 4 of these circumstances, the Supreme Court docket beforehand known as for the views of the solicitor basic, and requested amicus (“pal of the courtroom”) briefs have now arrived. As a result of assessment is especially likely in cases the place the courtroom has requested for the federal authorities’s views, we’ll start with these.
Federal preemption and generic medication
Monsanto Co. v. Durnell asks whether or not the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act preempts state-law failure-to-warn claims the place EPA has repeatedly accepted a pesticide label with out a most cancers warning and federal laws bar unilateral label modifications. A Missouri jury awarded $1.25 million to respondent John Durnell, who developed non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma after long-term Roundup use, discovering Monsanto responsible for failing to warn of most cancers dangers. The Missouri Court docket of Appeals affirmed the jury’s choice, holding that Missouri’s strict-liability failure-to-warn commonplace merely parallels FIFRA’s misbranding prohibition and subsequently isn’t “along with or totally different from” federal labeling necessities. In doing so, it expressly declined to observe the opposite choice of the U.S. Court docket of Appeals for the third Circuit in Schaffner v. Monsanto, which held that FIFRA preempts similar claims. A number of federal courts of appeals had beforehand reached the identical conclusion because the Missouri courtroom.
Monsanto argues that this case presents a clear and deepening circuit cut up over whether or not EPA’s label approval and its laws “lock in” labeling necessities, mandating preemption as a result of federal regulation makes it unimaginable so as to add to the label. Durnell responds that the decision might be sustained on non-label grounds (noting that there was no prohibition on together with warnings in advertising and off-label contexts) and that, in any occasion, FIFRA’s misbranding commonplace leaves room for state tort enforcement.
For the second time on this subject, the courtroom known as for the views of the solicitor basic. America now sides with Monsanto that the regulation is preempted, echoing a place the Justice Division took in the course of the first Trump administration, and urges assessment. That stated, the government took the alternative place a number of phrases in the past in Monsanto Co. v. Hardeman. With an entrenched cut up, and Roundup litigation persevering with to generate large verdicts nationwide, this case squarely tees up a recurring preemption query the courtroom has repeatedly sidestepped – however could discover more and more troublesome to disregard. I price this a really seemingly grant. (Monsanto has additionally filed companion petitions elevating the identical subject in Monsanto Co. v. Salas and Monsanto Co. v. Johnson, however Durnell appears the likeliest automobile.)
ERISA breach of fiduciary duties
Parker-Hannifin Corp v. Johnson asks whether or not plaintiffs pleading a breach-of-fiduciary-duty declare beneath the Worker Retirement Earnings Safety Act of 1974 – alleging that retirement plan fiduciaries imprudently retained underperforming investments – should present that their chosen efficiency benchmark is a significant comparator for the challenged funds. Plan individuals sued Parker-Hannifin, claiming it violated ERISA by sticking with the Northern Belief Focus Funds regardless of their lackluster returns in comparison with allegedly related alternate options, providing higher-cost shares, and failing to observe funds. The district courtroom dismissed for failure to state a declare, however the U.S. Court docket of Appeals for the sixth Circuit reversed 2-1, holding that the allegations plausibly advised imprudence beneath Hughes v. Northwestern University with out requiring apples-to-apples benchmark proof on the pleading stage. Petitioners argue this creates a cut up with the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the seventh, eighth, and tenth Circuits, which demand proof that comparators present significant benchmarks, whereas respondents counter that no true battle exists and ERISA’s prudence commonplace doesn’t hinge solely on efficiency comparisons.
The federal government, as court-invited amicus, advocates assessment, arguing each that the courts of appeals are divided and that the sixth Circuit’s choice is misguided, and it’s needed for courts to make use of “sound” benchmarks to cull meritless lawsuits. However the courtroom’s order inviting the federal government to file a quick famous that Justice Samuel Alito didn’t take part in consideration of the petition, suggesting he’s recused, and elevating the specter that the courtroom might divide 4-4 and be unable to resolve the case.
Anderson v. Intel Corporation Investment Policy Committee raises the identical subject, though the plaintiff is petitioning as a result of the U.S. Court docket of Appeals for the 9th Circuit required a comparable benchmark. Respondent the Intel Company Funding Coverage Committee argues the case doesn’t implicate a circuit cut up and doesn’t warrant the courtroom’s assessment. However it nonetheless says that if the courtroom decides to handle the query, the courtroom ought to grant Anderson as effectively to make sure that Alito’s recusal doesn’t forestall the courtroom from resolving the case.
Patent infringement and generic medication
Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc., asks whether or not a generic drugmaker might be hauled into courtroom for inducing (encouraging or facilitating) patent infringement based mostly on its public (that’s, not on its label) statements that its product is the “generic model” of a brand-name drug and its quotation of the branded drug’s gross sales figures – even when the generic makes use of a so-called “skinny label” that appropriately carves out use of the generic model for the patented software. Particularly, Amarin sued after Hikma launched its generic model for extreme hypertriglyceridemia (a use for which the patent had expired), claiming Hikma’s press releases and web site inspired off-label use for Amarin’s patented cardiovascular-risk-reduction methodology. The district courtroom dismissed for failure to state a declare, however the U.S. Court docket of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed, discovering the allegations plausibly alleged induced infringement.
Hikma petitions, arguing that the Federal Circuit’s take a look at conflicts with the Hatch-Waxman Act’s pathway for generics to achieve the market and conflicts with the requirement of MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., that plaintiffs plead the defendant has taken “lively steps … to encourage direct infringement, reminiscent of promoting an infringing use or instructing methods to interact in an infringing use.” Amarin opposes, insisting that Hikma seeks fact-bound error correction which isn’t appropriate for the Supreme Court docket.
The solicitor basic’s court-invited amicus brief urges the courtroom to grant and reverse, echoing the place it unsuccessfully took in an identical case in Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC. The solicitor basic argues that even the specter of going to discovery right here might chill skinny-label use and delay lower-cost medication. Common readers of Relist Watch know that that is the courtroom’s second serious look at pharma inducement in three terms, suggesting it might be teetering towards a grant to make clear whether or not imprecise advertising puffery crosses the “lively inducement” line, particularly when state substitution legal guidelines already nudge generics into off-label territory. In Teva, Justice Brett Kavanaugh noted that he would vote to grant assessment; we’ll know quickly whether or not he’s persuaded three of his colleagues to do the identical. On the time, I rated Teva a likely grant. So you possibly can draw your individual conclusions.
International Sovereign Immunities Act
Agudas Chasidei Chabad of United States v. Russian Federation asks whether or not the International Sovereign Immunities Act’s expropriation exception strips a international state itself of immunity from go well with when stolen property is owned or operated by a state instrumentality that engages in industrial exercise in the USA, even when the property isn’t current on this nation. The statutory text applies if the property (i) “is current in the USA in reference to a industrial exercise carried on in the USA by the international state,” or (ii) “is owned or operated by an company or instrumentality of the international state and that company or instrumentality is engaged in a industrial exercise in the USA.”
Chabad has spent a long time looking for the return of its assortment of 1000’s of sacred spiritual texts and archival supplies seized by Soviet authorities and now held by Russian state archives. Though Chabad obtained a default judgment and large contempt sanctions after Russia withdrew from the litigation, the U.S. Court docket of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit finally held that the Russian Federation retained sovereign immunity as a result of the gathering is positioned overseas, concluding that solely the primary FSIA nexus clause (property current in the USA) can abrogate a international state’s immunity.
Chabad argues that the choice rewrites the statute by requiring each presence and possession to be current, and that the D.C. Circuit’s strategy successfully nullifies the expropriation exception for claims towards international states. It argues that there’s a circuit cut up, pointing to choices of the ninth and eleventh Circuits holding the exception glad if the second nexus clause to international sovereigns is met and notes that the D.C. Circuit itself upheld jurisdiction on this very case years earlier. Tenex-USA, a Russian state-owned firm focused for attachment, responds that there isn’t any true circuit cut up, that different courts have by no means squarely determined the query, and that extending jurisdiction based mostly on an instrumentality’s U.S. contacts would contradict the FSIA’s construction and settled ideas of sovereign separateness.
In its court-invited amicus temporary, the United States now urges review – albeit in a comparatively halfhearted method. The federal government states solely that Chabad has “plausibly allege[d] confusion within the decrease courts on the query introduced,” and acknowledges that the federal government has up to now downplayed the depth of the cut up. The federal government additionally acknowledges that previously it has taken the place that the D.C. Circuit’s place is appropriate and “[i]n the course of getting ready this temporary, the USA has not decided whether or not it maintains that place on the deserves.” However the authorities states that the difficulty is “necessary” and “readability as to jurisdictional points might help to keep away from needlessly protracted litigation.” Each Justices Brett Kavanaugh and Ketanji Brown Jackson could be recused as a result of they served on the D.C. Circuit on the time the case was earlier than that courtroom, however “that might nonetheless depart the Court docket with an odd variety of members and thereby keep away from the prospect of an equally divided courtroom.”
Now on to the non-CVSG circumstances.
The state-secrets privilege
Federal Bureau of Investigation v. Fazaga, returns to the courtroom for a second time, now asking whether or not a courtroom could dismiss claims beneath the state-secrets privilege solely after adjudicating the deserves of the federal government’s protection utilizing the very privileged data the privilege is supposed to exclude. After the Supreme Court unanimously held in 2022 that FISA doesn’t displace the state-secrets privilege, the ninth Circuit on remand once more reversed the district courtroom’s dismissal of respondents’ religion-based surveillance claims. Though the ninth Circuit agreed that the federal government correctly invoked the privilege and that privileged data could be important to the federal government’s protection, it held that dismissal is permissible provided that the federal government first demonstrates – by detailed submissions – that the privileged proof “clearly reveals” a meritorious protection requiring judgment for the federal government.
The government argues that the ninth Circuit’s strategy basically misunderstands the state-secrets doctrine. It maintains that ordinarily, when courts decide that the federal government has correctly invoked that privilege and that the privileged data could be central to additional litigation, the rule is that the privileged data should be faraway from the case and dismissal is required if the go well with would danger disclosure of that data. The federal government argues that, by requiring courts to make use of privileged proof to resolve deserves questions, the choice successfully nullifies the privilege by forcing the manager to decide on between disclosing delicate data to maintain a protection or forfeiting dismissal altogether. Yassir Fazaga and the opposite plaintiffs counter that the choice merely prevents dismissal based mostly on hypothesis and aligns with longstanding D.C. Circuit precedent requiring a displaying {that a} “legitimate protection” is definitely “meritorious and never merely believable.” Including an uncommon wrinkle, the federal government alternatively asks the courtroom to grant, vacate, and remand for additional consideration in gentle of “a big intervening occasion”: the current recantation of the FBI informant whose allegations underpin respondents’ claims that the FBI focused them for surveillance solely due to their faith.
Geofence warrants
Chatrie v. United States asks whether or not regulation enforcement’s use of a so-called “geofence warrant” to acquire location-history information from Google violates the Fourth Modification, and whether or not suppression is categorically unavailable beneath the good-faith exception. After a Virginia financial institution theft, police obtained a warrant directing Google to supply an anonymized checklist of gadgets current close to the crime scene throughout a one-hour window. Officers narrowed that checklist and – with out a further warrant – obtained details about the motion of sure gadgets throughout a two-hour interval. Then officers – once more with out a further warrant – obtained de-anonymized subscriber details about three gadgets. A type of gadgets belonged to petitioner Okello Chatrie. Primarily based on the proof derived from the geofence warrant, petitioner was convicted of armed theft. Sitting en banc, the Fourth Circuit affirmed in a one-sentence per curiam, producing 9 separate opinions. The courtroom cut up on whether or not acquiring the information was a “search” beneath Carpenter v. United States, however a majority concluded that suppression was unwarranted as a result of officers moderately relied on a warrant issued amid substantial authorized uncertainty.
Chatrie argues that the choice deepens a rising and untenable cut up over the Fourth Modification reasonableness of geofence warrants, pointing to the choice of the U.S. Court docket of Appeals for the fifth Circuit in United States v. Smith, which deemed such warrants unconstitutional basic warrants (though it refused to suppress as a result of the officers relied in good religion on the warrant). He additionally warns that routine reliance on the good-faith exception threatens to insulate geofence warrants from significant Supreme Court docket assessment altogether. The federal government responds that the case is a poor automobile as a result of suppression could be unavailable no matter how the Fourth Modification query is resolved (as a result of good-faith exception), and since Google’s current modifications to its data-retention practices could restrict the difficulty’s future significance. Of be aware, X Corp. – homeowners of the social media platform beforehand often known as Twitter – have filed an amicus brief supporting Chatrie.
Davis v. United States additionally purports to lift the difficulty in regards to the lawfulness of a geofence warrant. However the data uncovered by the geofence warrant involved not the petitioner Johnnie Leeanozg Davis, however his girlfriend and his girlfriend’s daughter, and the federal government argues (and the U.S. Court docket of Appeals for the eleventh Circuit beneath held) that Davis lacks standing to problem a search involving information linked to a 3rd get together.
Deference to Sentencing Tips commentary
Within the 1993 case of Stinson v. United States, the Supreme Court docket held that the U.S. Sentencing Fee’s explanatory commentary on the Sentencing Tips “is authoritative except it violates the Structure or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly misguided studying of, that guideline.” Poore v. United States asks whether or not, after Kisor v. Wilkie (which required a displaying of real ambiguity earlier than company interpretations of laws warranted deference) and Loper Bright v. Raimondo (which abolished deference to company interpretations of ambiguous statutes) courts could proceed to reflexively defer beneath Stinson to the Sentencing Fee’s commentary when decoding the Tips – significantly the place that commentary expands an unambiguous guideline and will increase a defendant’s sentence. Petitioner Raymond Poore acquired an enhanced sentence after the district courtroom deferred to commentary treating inchoate offenses (reminiscent of being a celebration to a criminal offense) as “crime[s] of violence,” however the acknowledgment that the Guideline textual content itself unambiguously excluded such offenses. The U.S. Court docket of Appeals for the seventh Circuit then affirmed, deeming itself sure by circuit precedent making use of Stinson, and concluding that neither Kisor nor Loper Vibrant clearly displaced that framework.
Poore argues that Stinson rests on a deference regime that has been basically undermined: Kisor requires courts to seek out real ambiguity earlier than deferring to an company’s interpretation of its personal guidelines, and Loper Vibrant reinforces the judiciary’s obligation to train impartial judgment – particularly in felony circumstances, the place the rule of lenity applies (the rule that ambiguities in felony regulation ought to be interpreted in favor of the defendant). He argues that there’s an entrenched six to 6 circuit cut up, with half the circuits refusing to defer to Tips commentary absent real ambiguity and the opposite half persevering with to deal with commentary as binding.
The government argues that this case is a poor automobile, asserting that it’s is moot as a result of Poore has accomplished serving his sentence and has recognized no collateral penalties. It additionally downplays the cut up’s significance in gentle of current Tips amendments, and characterizes the choice beneath as a routine software of circuit precedent. The federal government notes that the courtroom has repeatedly and lately denied assessment on different circumstances presenting this subject, which I do know solely too effectively – the courtroom denied my (completely good!) petition raising this same issue again in 2021. Not that I’m bitter or something.
State taxation of Indians on reservation land
Stroble v. Oklahoma Tax Commission asks whether or not Oklahoma can tax the earnings of a Muscogee (Creek) Nation member who works on tribal land held in belief and who lives on non-public property throughout the historic Creek territory acknowledged as a reservation in McGirt v. Oklahoma – or if federal regulation preempts such taxation absent specific congressional consent. That tribal member, Alicia Stroble, a on line casino employee, sought a refund for state earnings taxes, arguing McGirt upended Oklahoma’s taxing authority. The state supreme courtroom disagreed, holding McGirt didn’t abrogate longstanding tax statutes. Stroble petitions, arguing the choice beneath is inconsistent with a long time of Supreme Court docket precedent “prohibiting States from imposing taxes on Indians who dwell and work inside their Tribes’ Indian nation absent specific authorization from Congress,” and creates a battle with different courts of appeals which have utilized that precedent. Oklahoma opposes, agreeing that the difficulty is “undeniably necessary,” however arguing that assessment isn’t warranted as a result of the choice beneath is appropriate and additional assessment would create dangerous uncertainty. Stroble’s reply once more blasts the choice as conflicting with “[a]n unbroken line of this Court docket’s precedents.”
Whether or not “totality” means “totality”
District of Columbia v. R.W. addresses whether or not courts evaluating cheap suspicion for a cease beneath Terry v. Ohio could exclude information recognized to an officer earlier than weighing the totality of the circumstances. Responding to a wee-hours dispatch telling police to be looking out for a suspicious or stolen automobile at a specific deal with, a D.C. officer noticed two passengers flee from the one occupied automotive in a small car parking zone at that deal with after which noticed the driving force try to again out with a rear door nonetheless open. The automotive was certainly stolen and 15-year-old R.W., its driver, was adjudicated delinquent. The D.C. Court of Appeals suppressed evidence from the stop, holding that the dispatch needed to be excluded from the evaluation (as a result of the data was of unknown reliability), as did the passengers’ flight (as a result of there was purportedly no purpose to attribute it to the automobile’s driver), and that the remaining information had been inadequate to justify a seizure.
Seeking review, D.C. characterizes the courtroom of appeals’ argument as an “isolationist approach,” improperly excluding elements earlier than assessing the totality of the proof. D.C. argues that the choice squarely conflicts with the Supreme Court docket’s repeated rejection of a piecemeal Fourth Modification evaluation and deepens a cut up with a number of federal circuits and state courts that require consideration of all circumstances recognized to the officer. Twenty-eight states and the National Fraternal Order of Police assist assessment, warning that the ruling undermines officer security and creates untenable confusion – significantly in D.C., the place native and federal courts apply divergent requirements. The opposite facet counters that the case is factbound, that the courtroom beneath correctly required articulable assist for imprecise dispatches and guilt-by-association inferences, and that no true cut up exists. Maybe sensing that this case is sufficiently factbound to be an uncommon candidate for Supreme Court docket assessment, D.C. argues in its reply that “[t]he authorized error right here was sufficiently simple to justify abstract reversal [an unsigned opinion reversing the lower court].” Which may be into account.
One other “misplaced trigger”
Lastly, we now have a case that falls right into a class I have uncharitably dubbed “misplaced causes.” These are circumstances which have been relisted despite the fact that no temporary has been filed in response to the cert petition, when the courtroom has not granted assessment with out first calling for such a quick. In Diehl v. United States, self-represented federal prisoner David A. Diehl argues that his conviction violated the ex publish facto clause prohibiting retroactive punishment, though he by no means raised that argument beneath. We’ll see if Diehl will get any traction. Whereas there’s one “misplaced trigger” that has stuck around a while, the Supreme Court docket has dispatched most of them promptly.
That – lastly – is all for this week. Truthfully, I’m not sure I’m going to be able to continue if the relists preserve coming on the price they’ve since December.
New Relists
Hikma Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. v. Amarin Pharma, Inc., 24-889
Points: (1) Whether or not, when a generic drug label absolutely carves out a patented use, allegations that the generic drugmaker calls its product a “generic model” and cites public details about the branded drug (e.g., gross sales) are sufficient to plead induced infringement of the patented use; and (2) whether or not a criticism states a declare for induced infringement of a patented methodology if it doesn’t allege any instruction or different assertion by the defendant that encourages, and even mentions, the patented use. CVSG: 12/05/2025
(Relisted after the Jan. 9 convention.)
Agudas Chasidei Chabad of United States v. Russian Federation, 24-909
Situation: Whether or not a “international state” lacks immunity from U.S. jurisdiction beneath the International Sovereign Immunities Act if both U.S.-nexus take a look at in 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) is met, or as a substitute a “international state” loses its immunity provided that the primary U.S.-nexus take a look at is met – i.e., if the expropriated property, or property exchanged for it, is present in the USA.
CVSG: 12/09/2025
(Relisted after the Jan. 9 convention.)
Parker-Hannifin Corp v. Johnson, 24-1030
Situation: Whether or not pleading an imprudent-investment declare beneath the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, based mostly on how the funding’s returns in comparison with some efficiency benchmark, requires allegations displaying that the benchmark is a sound foundation for comparability for that funding. CVSG: 12/09/2025
(Relisted after the Jan. 9 convention.)
Monsanto Co. v. Durnell, 24-1068
Situation: Whether or not the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act preempts a state-law failure-to-warn declare the place the Environmental Safety Company has repeatedly concluded that the warning isn’t required and the warning can’t be added to a product with out EPA approval. CVSG: 12/01/2025
(Relisted after the Jan. 9 convention.)
Monsanto Co. v. Salas, 24-1097
Situation: Whether or not the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act preempts a state-law failure-to-warn declare the place the Environmental Safety Company has repeatedly concluded that the warning isn’t required and the warning can’t be added to a product with out EPA approval.
(Relisted after the Jan. 9 convention.)
Monsanto Co. v. Johnson, 24-1098
Situation: Whether or not the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act preempts a state-law failure-to-warn declare the place the Environmental Safety Company has repeatedly concluded that the warning isn’t required and the warning can’t be added to a product with out EPA approval.
(Relisted after the Jan. 9 convention.)
Chatrie v. United States, 25-112
Situation: (1) Whether or not the execution of a geofence warrant violated the Fourth Modification; and (2) whether or not the exclusionary rule ought to apply to the proof derived from a geofence warrant.
(Relisted after the Jan. 9 convention.)
Poore v. United States, 25-227
Situation: Whether or not the boundaries on company deference introduced in Kisor v. Wilkie and Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo constrain the deference courts could accord the Sentencing Fee’s interpretation of its personal guidelines by way of commentary.
(Relisted after the Jan. 9 convention.)
District of Columbia v. R.W., 25-248
Situation: (1) Whether or not a courtroom assessing the existence of cheap suspicion beneath the Fourth Modification could exclude a reality recognized to the officer, or as a substitute should assess all of the proof when weighing the totality of the circumstances; and (2) whether or not, beneath the totality-of-the-circumstances take a look at, the officer on this case had cheap suspicion to conduct an investigative cease.
(Relisted after the Jan. 9 convention.)
Stroble v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 25-382
Situation: Whether or not Oklahoma could tax the earnings of a Muscogee (Creek) Nation citizen who lives and works throughout the Muscogee (Creek) Reservation that McGirt v. Oklahoma held stays Indian nation.
(Relisted after the Jan. 9 convention.)
Federal Bureau of Investigation v. Fazaga, 25-430
Situation: Whether or not dismissal of a declare after assertion of the state-secrets privilege requires a district courtroom to adjudicate the deserves of the declare utilizing the privileged data the place the privileged data is related to a protection.
(Relisted after the Jan. 9 convention.)
Anderson v. Intel Corporation Investment Policy Comm., 25-498
Situation: Whether or not, for claims predicated on fund underperformance, pleading that an Employee Retirement Income Security Act fiduciary failed to make use of the requisite “care, ability, prudence, or diligence” beneath the circumstances and thus breached ERISA’s obligation of prudence when investing plan belongings requires alleging a “significant benchmark.”
(Relisted after the Jan. 9 convention.)
Davis v. United States, 25-5189
Points: (1) whether or not assessment is warranted to resolve disagreement among the many circuits in regards to the reasonableness of geofence warrants; (2) whether or not the document as an entire demonstrates improper collusion between federal and state regulation enforcement to make Davis’s arrest by state officers topic to the federal presentment necessities set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) and Rule 5(a), Fed. R. Crim. P.; (3) whether or not Davis’s movement for judgment of acquittal ought to have been granted on the three carjacking counts for need of enough proof that Davis had the intent to kill or significantly injure anybody.
(Relisted after the Jan. 9 convention.)
Sanchez v. United States, 25-6153
Points: (1)Whether or not § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Modification facially; (2) whether or not § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Modification as utilized to people with convictions for offenses that didn’t contain the misuse of firearms or set up a reputable menace of such misuse.
(Relisted after the Jan. 9 convention.)
Wilson v. United States, 25-6187
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Modification.
(Relisted after the Jan. 9 convention.)
Williams v. United States, 25-6189
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all people beforehand convicted of a felony violates the Second Modification, both facially or as utilized to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Jan. 9 convention.)
Diehl v. United States, 25-6278
Points: (1) Whether or not the Fifth Circuit had subject material jurisdiction on direct attraction to contemplate an ex publish facto constitutional argument that was by no means raised; (2) whether or not the complete ex publish facto clause applies the place the offense occurred previous to United States v. Booker in gentle of Peugh v. United States; (3) whether or not Diehl introduced information displaying fraud on the courtroom for functions of Federal Rule of Civil Process Rule 60(d)(3).
(Relisted after the Jan. 9 convention.)
Returning Relists
Points: (1) Whether or not, viewing the information from the officers’ perspective on the time, the officers acted moderately beneath the Fourth Modification through the use of body weight strain to restrain a probably armed and actively resisting particular person solely till handcuffing may very well be completed; and (2) whether or not the panel erred in denying certified immunity the place no case clearly established that pre-handcuffing body weight strain violates the Fourth Modification.
(Relisted after the Sept. 29, Oct. 10, Oct. 17, Nov. 7, Nov. 14, Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Situation: Whether or not the U.S. Court docket of Appeals for the 4th Circuit violated the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act‘s deferential commonplace by overturning a state-court choice based mostly on the supposed lack of “nuance” and “exhaustiveness” within the courtroom’s written opinion, quite than the reasonableness of its authorized conclusion.
(Relisted after the Sept. 29, Oct. 10, Oct. 17, Nov. 7, Nov. 14, Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Indiana, ex rel. Howell v. Circuit Court docket of Indiana, Wells County, 25-5557
Points: (1)Whether or not petitioner made a enough factual displaying to ascertain “good trigger” for locating precise judicial bias by displaying that the trial decide had made particular allegations as to how his case was affected; (2) whether or not the Indiana Supreme Court docket erred in holding that each Indiana Submit-Conviction Treatments Rule 1, Part 12 movement constitutes a prohibited “second or successive” petition as a matter of regulation; (3) whether or not a prosecutor’s failure to appropriate testimony of a witness that he knew to be false was used to acquire a conviction, despite the fact that different testimony concerning the witness’s credibility was launched.
(Relisted after the Nov. 7, Nov. 14, Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Allen v. Guzman, 25-5879
Points: Whether or not petitioner has a state-created liberty within the appointment of counsel beneath the newly enacted California Racial Justice Act Penal Gode Part 1473(e), which offers that “the courtroom shall appoint counsel, if the petitioner can’t afford counsel. “
(Relisted after the Nov. 14, Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Situation: Whether or not the Second Modification permits the federal authorities to completely disarm Petitioner, who has one seventeen-year-old nonviolent felony conviction for making an attempt to move a nasty test.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Mayfield v. United States, 24-7400
Situation: Whether or not Mr. Mayfield’s conviction beneath 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional beneath the Second Modification in gentle of New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Medrano v. United States, 24-7508
Points: (1) Whether or not 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) comports with the Second Modification as utilized to a defendant whose most severe prior felony convictions are tried housebreaking and automobile theft; (2) whether or not an appellate courtroom ought to take at face worth the assertion of sentencing judges that they’d have chosen the very same sentence no matter any error in making use of the Sentencing Tips.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Foote v. Ludlow School Committee, 25-77
Situation: Whether or not a public college violates dad and mom’ constitutional rights when, with out parental data or consent, the varsity encourages a pupil to transition to a brand new “gender” or participates in that course of.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Duarte v. United States, 25-425
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1)’s categorical ban on the possession of firearms by felons is unconstitutional as utilized to a defendant with non-violent predicate offenses underlying his conviction.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Willis v. United States, 25-5009
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional beneath the Second Modification, each facially and as utilized to Mr. Willis, in gentle of New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Howard v. United States, 25-5220
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) comports with the Second Modification as utilized to a defendant whose most severe prior felony conviction is drug trafficking.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Marshall v. United States, 25-5259
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which completely prohibits possession of a firearm by an individual who has been convicted of a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment for a time period exceeding one yr, is topic to as-applied challenges beneath the Second Modification.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Reese v. United States, 25-5327
Points: (1) Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits felons from possessing firearms or ammunition, violates the Second Modification—both on its face or as utilized to the petitioner, who has no violent felony conviction; (2) whether or not § 922(g)(1), which purports to make a felon’s intrastate possession of firearms and ammunition a federal crime solely as a result of these objects crossed state traces sooner or later, exceeds Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Compton v. United States, 25-5358
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all people beforehand convicted of any felony offense violates the Second Modification, both facially or as utilized to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Osbourne v. United States, 25-5382
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all people beforehand convicted of any felony violates the Second Modification, both facially or as utilized to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Cantu v. United States, 25-5388
Situation: Whether or not, because the Eighth Circuit held, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (which prohibits any felon from possessing firearms) is invariably constitutional each facially and as utilized to any defendant, irrespective of the case-specific circumstances.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Williams v. United States, 25-5415
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as utilized when the predicate convictions which make the particular person ineligible to own a firearm had been pursuant to a statute which had been discovered facially unconstitutional for violating the Second Modification.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Mitchell v. United States, 25-5417
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all people beforehand convicted of a felony violates the Second Modification, both facially or as utilized to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Hernandez v. United States, 25-5421
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the federal statute that prohibits anybody who has been convicted of “a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment for a time period exceeding one yr” from possessing a firearm, violates the Second Modification both facially or as utilized to people with prior convictions for non-violent offenses.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Kearney v. United States, 25-5424
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all people beforehand convicted of a felony violates the Second Modification, both facially or as utilized to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Terry v. United States, 25-5433
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all people beforehand convicted of a felony violates the Second Modification, both facially or as utilized to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Thompson v. United States, 25-5434
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all people beforehand convicted of a felony violates the Second Modification, both facially or as utilized to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Fowler v. United States, 25-5437
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all people beforehand convicted of a felony violates the Second Modification, both facially or as utilized to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Finney v. United States, 25-5438
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all people beforehand convicted of a felony violates the Second Modification, both facially or as utilized to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Greene v. United States, 25-5439
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all people beforehand convicted of a felony violates the Second Modification, both facially or as utilized to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Perry v. United States, 25-5441
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all people beforehand convicted of a felony violates the Second Modification, both facially or as utilized to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Crews v. United States, 25-5443
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all people beforehand convicted of a felony violates the Second Modification, both facially or as utilized to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Gilbert v. United States, 25-5607
Points: (1) Whether or not defendants could assert as-applied challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) beneath the Second Modification; (2) whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession by felons violates the Second Modification as utilized to Mr. Gilbert, who was beforehand convicted of a non-violent theft offense.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Coleman v. United States, 25-5614
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all people
beforehand convicted of a felony violates the Second Modification, both facially or as
utilized to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Brown v. United States, 25-5624
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all people beforehand convicted of a felony violates the Second Modification, both facially or as utilized to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Chafin v. United States, 25-5626
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all people beforehand convicted of any felony offense violates the Second Modification as utilized to Mr. Chafin.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Coles v. United States, 25-5627
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all people beforehand convicted of a felony violates the Second Modification, both facially or as utilized to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Allen v. United States, 25-5655
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all people beforehand convicted of a felony violates the Second Modification, both facially or as utilized to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Sternquist v. United States, 25-5656
Points: (1)Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face or as utilized to Ms. Sternquist as a result of, in step with the Second Modification, the federal authorities could not completely disarm residents like her, who’ve solely remote-intime, nonviolent prior felony convictions; (2) whether or not ATF’s definition of “silencer” as together with tubes that don’t have holes drilled in them is opposite to the statutory definition of “silencer,” and whether or not, following Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, it’s error for the courts to defer totally to ATF’s definition with out conducting their very own evaluation.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Royal v. United States, 25-5658
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all people beforehand convicted of a felony violates the Second Modification, both facially or as utilized to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
City v. United States, 25-5667
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all people beforehand convicted of a felony violates the Second Modification, both facially or as utilized to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Coleman v. United States, 25-5668
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all people beforehand convicted of a felony violates the Second Modification, both facially or as utilized to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Shoffner v. United States, 25-5678
Situation: Whether or not the district courtroom erred in denying appellant’s movement to dismiss the indictment on the Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Robinson v. United States, 25-5707
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which completely prohibits possession of a firearm by an individual who has been convicted of a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment for a time period exceeding one yr, is topic to as-applied challenges beneath the Second Modification.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Ketzner v. United States, 25-5708
Situation: Whether or not the Second Modification permits the federal authorities to completely disarm Petitioner Jason Ketzner, on account of prior felony convictions, whatever the nature of these convictions and with none individualized judicial willpower of his dangerousness.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Brown v. United States, 25-5731
Points: (1) Whether or not defendants could assert as-applied challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) beneath the Second Modification; (2) whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession by felons violates the Second Modification as utilized to Mr. Brown, who was beforehand convicted of non-violent felony drug possession and gun possession offenses.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Kimble v. United States, 25-5747
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the federal statute that prohibits anybody who has been convicted of “a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment for a time period exceeding one yr” from possessing a firearm, violates the Second Modification both facially or as utilized to people with convictions for non-violent offenses.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Lee v. United States, 25-5748
Situation: Whether or not Mr. Lee’s conviction beneath 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional beneath the Second Modification in gentle of New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Staley v. United States, 25-5850
Points: (1) Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the statute completely prohibiting possession of firearms by individuals convicted of a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment for a time period exceeding one yr, is topic to as-applied challenges beneath the Second Modification; (2) whether or not § 922(g)(1) is constitutional beneath the Second Modification as utilized to Mr. Staley, whose prior felonies had been themselves nonviolent gun-possession offenses.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Peck v. United States, 25-5858
Points: (1) Whether or not 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(l) violates the Second Modification as utilized to Petitioner, who was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm based mostly on a Nebraska conviction for marijuana possession; (2) whether or not the Leon good religion exception to the Fourth Modification’s exclusionary rule applies when regulation enforcement has not taken cheap steps to coach itself on the regulation of the Fourth Modification.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Hemphill v. United States, 25-5875
Situation: Whether or not the Fifth Circuit appropriately utilized the reasoning of the Supreme Court docket’s opinion in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), in deciding that the Second Modification didn’t apply to Mr. Hemphill’s possession of a firearm.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Robinson v. United States, 25-5903
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Modification.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Contreras v. United States, 25-5909
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the federal statute that prohibits anybody who has been convicted of “a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment for a time period exceeding one yr” from possessing a firearm, violates the Second Modification both facially or as utilized to people with prior convictions for offenses that didn’t end in disarmament within the Founding period.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Espinal v. United States, 25-5916
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face or as utilized to Petitioner as a result of, in step with the Second Modification, the federal authorities could not completely bar a citizen from possessing a firearm and ammunition based mostly completely on a previous felony conviction.
(Relisted after the Nov. 21, Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Situation: Whether or not the requirement {that a} verdict be based mostly solely on the proof introduced within the courtroom at trial satisfies 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)‘s “clearly established” requirement, and in that case, whether or not a jury’s consideration of and reliance on extrinsic proof as a part of a jury experiment violates this rule.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Situation: Whether or not Article 64 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, as authoritatively construed by the Texas Court docket of Legal Appeals, violates due course of by arbitrarily denying prisoners entry to postconviction DNA testing, rendering illusory prisoners’ state-created proper to show their innocence by newly found proof.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Gator’s Custom Guns, Inc. v. Washington, 25-153
Situation: Whether or not ammunition feeding gadgets with the capability to carry greater than ten rounds are “Arms” presumptively entitled to constitutional safety beneath the plain textual content of the Second Modification.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Situation: (1) Whether or not a ban on the possession of exceedingly widespread ammunition feeding gadgets violates the Second Modification; and (2) whether or not a regulation dispossessing residents, with out compensation, of property that they lawfully acquired and lengthy possessed with out incident violates the takings clause.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Viramontes v. Cook County, 25-238
Situation: Whether or not the Second and Fourteenth Amendments assure the appropriate to own AR-15 platform and related semiautomatic rifles.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Situation: Whether or not the Second Circuit’s certified immunity evaluation conflicts with this courtroom’s repeated instruction that courts should outline rights with specificity and search for shut factual analogues in figuring out whether or not a Fourth Modification proper is clearly established.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Adams v. United States, 25-5467
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits felons from possessing firearms or ammunition, violates the Second Modification.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Thomas v. United States, 25-5477
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the federal statute that prohibits anybody who has been convicted of “a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment for a time period exceeding one yr” from possessing a firearm, violates the Second Modification both facially or as utilized to people with prior convictions for non-violent offenses.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Olivas v. United States, 25-5481
Points: (1) How ought to courts resolve whether or not a person prosecution or conviction beneath 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is in step with the Second Modification to the Structure; (2) whether or not Congress has the constitutional authority to enact a statute banning a former felon from possessing “in or affecting commerce” a firearm if the firearm was made in one other state.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Haynes v. United States, 25-5482
Situation: Whether or not, because the Eighth Circuit held, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (which prohibits any felon from possessing firearms) is invariably constitutional each facially and as utilized to any defendant, irrespective of the case-specific circumstances.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Truex v. United States, 25-5485
Points: (1) Whether or not § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Modification facially; (2) whether or not, to find out the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) as utilized to a defendant, should courts study whether or not there’s a historic custom completely disarming an individual with analogous convictions as a substitute of counting on a historic custom disarming somebody serving a sentence.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Scott v. United States, 25-5503
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all people beforehand convicted of a felony violates the Second Modification, both facially or as utilized to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Barry v. United States, 25-5510
Points: (1) Whether or not courts ought to analyze as-applied Second Modification challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) by inspecting whether or not historic custom helps completely disarming somebody for the predicate offense(s) underlying the defendant’s conviction; (2) whether or not § 922(g)(1), on its face, unconstitutionally abridges the Second Modification proper to maintain and bear arms.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Betancourt v. United States, 25-5514
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) – the federal statute that prohibits an individual from possessing a firearm if he has been convicted of “a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment for a time period exceeding one yr“ – complies with the Second Modification.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Garcia v. United States, 25-5516
Points: (1) Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits felons from possessing firearms or ammunition, violates the Second Modification – both on its face or as utilized to the petitioner; (2) whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which purports to make a felon’s intrastate possession of firearms and ammunition a federal crime solely as a result of these objects crossed state traces sooner or later, exceeds Congress’s Commerce Clause authority.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Moore v. United States, 25-5522
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) comports with the Second Modification as utilized to a defendant whose most severe prior felony conviction is drug trafficking.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Carbajal v. United States, 25-5535
Points: (1) Whether or not § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Modification facially; (2) whether or not § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Modification as utilized to people with convictions for offenses that didn’t contain the misuse of firearms or set up a reputable menace of such misuse.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Nelson v. United States, 25-5550
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face or as utilized to Petitioner as a result of, in step with the Second Modification, the federal authorities could not completely disarm residents with solely remote-in-time, nonviolent prior felony convictions.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Branson v. United States, 25-5565
Points: (1) Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) comports with the Second Modification; (2) whether or not Congress could criminalize intrastate firearm possession based mostly solely on the firearm crossing state traces sooner or later previous to the defendant’s possession.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Alvarez v. United States, 25-5566
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(1) comports with the Second Modification as utilized to a defendant with prior felony convictions for drug possession, publishing unauthorized intimate photographs of one other, and unauthorized use of a motorized vehicle.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Owens v. United States, 25-5952
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all people beforehand convicted of a felony violates the Second Modification, both facially or as utilized to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Marrow v. United States, 25-5976
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all people beforehand convicted of a felony violates the Second Modification, both facially or as utilized to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Parker v. United States, 25-5999
Points: (1) Whether or not convicted felons have a Second Modification proper, or do solely law-abiding individuals take pleasure in this proper; (2) whether or not 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) withstands Second Modification scrutiny in all of its functions, or is it unconstitutional as utilized to some felons.
(Relisted after the Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Miller v. United States, 25-6054
Situation: Whether or not, as a result of the Circuit Courts of Appeals and District Courts are cut up, a writ of certiorari ought to be granted to settle the Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(l).
(Relisted after the Dec. 5, Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Situation: (1) Whether or not it clearly violates the First Modification to arrest somebody for asking authorities officers questions and publishing the data they volunteer; and (2) whether or not certified immunity is unavailable to public officers who use a state statute in a method that clearly violates the First Modification, or whether or not certified immunity shields these officers.
(Relisted after the Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc. v. County Commissioners of Boulder County, 25-170
Situation: Whether or not federal regulation precludes state-law claims looking for reduction for accidents allegedly brought on by the consequences of interstate and worldwide greenhouse-gas emissions on the worldwide local weather.
(Relisted after the Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Sittenfeld v. United States, 25-49
Situation: Whether or not, when the federal government alleges bribery based mostly solely on lawful marketing campaign contributions, the defendant could also be convicted based mostly on proof that’s ambiguous as as to whether the general public official conditioned any official act on the marketing campaign contributions.
(Relisted after the Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Situation: (1) Whether or not, pursuant to United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., this courtroom ought to vacate and remand with directions to dismiss the attraction as moot; and (2) whether or not, within the various, this courtroom ought to vacate and remand for additional consideration in gentle of Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic.
(Relisted after the Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Zherka v. Bondi, 25-269
Situation: Whether or not the Second Modification permits the federal government to disarm an American citizen as a result of he has been convicted of a non-violent fraud offense.
(Relisted after the Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Bush v. United States, 25-5597
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all people beforehand convicted of a felony violates the Second Modification, both facially or as utilized to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Seward v. United States, 25-5599
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all people beforehand convicted of a felony violates the Second Modification, both facially or as utilized to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Mason v. United States, 25-5601
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all people beforehand convicted of a felony violates the Second Modification, both facially or as utilized to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Campbell v. United States, 25-5603
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all people beforehand convicted of a felony violates the Second Modification, both facially or as utilized to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Morgan v. United States, 25-6062
Points: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Modification when utilized to people based mostly on their previous conviction for a non-violent offense. 2. Whether or not software of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violated the Commerce Clause the place the one proof of a nexus between the person’s firearm possession and interstate commerce consisted of the truth that the firearm had crossed a state line sooner or later earlier than coming into their possession.
(Relisted after the Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Stokes v. United States, 25-6064
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all people beforehand convicted of a felony violates the Second Modification, both facially or as utilized to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Whitaker v. United States, 25-6078
Points: (1) Whether or not after New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, and United States v. Rahimi, a felony defendant could increase an as-applied
Second Modification problem to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); (2) in that case, whether or not beneath the Bruen/Rahimi methodology, the Second Modification is unconstitutional as utilized to a defendant like Petitioner with solely non-violent priors.
(Relisted after the Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Sullivan v. United States, 25-6100
Points: (1) Whether or not Petitioner was induced to take a plea settlement as a result of Petitioner believed she would get a lesser sentence to 4 counts based mostly on Decide J. Michael Seabright’s statements which petitioner relied on when taking a plea deal; (2) whether or not Petitioner ought to have been allowed to withdraw her plea; (3) whether or not Petitioner has proven prejudice from using video and teleconference throughout Petitioner’s change of plea listening to, as Petitioner wouldn’t have proceeded together with her responsible plea if she waited to look in particular person if the district courtroom made extra detailed findings in regards to the want for teleconference; (4) whether or not petitioner ought to have been capable of withdraw her plea when she claimed her innocence to identification theft; 5) whether or not the statute of limitations is a jurisdictional requirement that can’t be waived by a plea settlement; (6) whether or not there was prosecutorial misconduct when the when Assistant United States Lawyer argued towards the 3-level discount they’d could be given to me for acceptance of duty.
(Relisted after the Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Gonzalez v. United States, 25-6106
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face or as utilized to petitioner as a result of, in step with the Second Modification, the federal authorities could not completely disarm residents whose prior felony convictions had been for nonviolent offenses solely.
(Relisted after the Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Johnson v. United States, 25-6107
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)’s lifetime ban on firearm possession for all people beforehand convicted of a felony violates the Second Modification, both facially or as utilized to the Petitioner.
(Relisted after the Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Williams v. United States, 25-6108
Points: 1. Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the statute completely prohibiting possession of firearms by individuals convicted of a criminal offense punishable by imprisonment for a time period exceeding one yr, is constitutional beneath the Second Modification. 2. Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as a result of it exceeds Congress’s authority beneath the Commerce Clause as utilized to intrastate possession of a firearm.
(Relisted after the Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Granger v. United States, 65-6122
Points: (1) Whether or not convicted felons have a Second Modification proper, or whether or not solely law-abiding individuals take pleasure in this proper; (2) whether or not 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) face up to Second Modification scrutiny in all of its functions, or whether or not it’s unconstitutional as utilized to some felons.
(Relisted after the Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
Williams v. United States, 25-6129
Situation: Whether or not 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Modification of the USA Structure, on its face or as utilized to Petitioner, as a result of the Second Modification doesn’t allow the federal authorities to completely disarm an individual in that particular person’s dwelling based mostly on a previous felony conviction.
(Relisted after the Dec. 12 and Jan. 9 conferences.)
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Dockets on most overdrive: seventeen new relists involving ten points,
SCOTUSblog (Jan. 15, 2026, 12:29 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/01/dockets-on-maximum-overdrive-seventeen-new-relists-involving-ten-issues/